Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have deepened in 2025, rekindling fears of renewed instability in the Horn of Africa. At the heart of the discord lies the fragile situation in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region and Addis Ababa’s growing geopolitical ambitions. While large-scale conflict has not yet returned, recent developments suggest that the region’s fragile peace may not hold.
Tigray remains a crucible of unresolved grievances and festering political divisions. Though the guns have largely fallen silent since the Pretoria Agreement, the scars of a brutal war that left more than 600,000 dead are still raw. Infrastructure remains in ruin, hundreds of thousands remain displaced, and trust between Mekelle and Addis Ababa is strained. The region’s untapped mineral wealth, particularly its gold reserves, only adds complexity to the landscape.
Beyond Tigray, Ethiopia’s broader regional calculus is shifting. With more than 128 million people and no access to the sea since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia is pressing ahead with plans to secure port access along the Red Sea. This effort is part of what Ethiopian officials call the “Grand Strategy of the Two Waters” — a vision linking the nation’s future to control and access over two key strategic zones: the Abay River and the Red Sea corridor.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s pursuit of these objectives has brought the country into sharper conflict with regional powers. Eritrea views Ethiopia’s ambitions as a direct challenge to its sovereignty. The possibility of Ethiopia using force or coercion to secure Red Sea access has raised alarm in Asmara, prompting President Isaias Afwerki to consolidate alliances.
In a significant diplomatic move last October, Eritrea hosted a high-level summit with Somalia and Egypt. The three countries, traditionally wary of Ethiopia’s regional posture, emerged from the meeting with a unified front. Egypt, locked in a protracted dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, seized the moment to reaffirm its opposition to what it sees as Ethiopia’s aggressive hydropolitics.
The summit culminated in the Ankara Declaration, a trilateral document that reaffirmed the importance of respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity. This was widely seen as a rebuke to Ethiopia’s controversial maritime Memorandum of Understanding with the breakaway region of Somaliland. Though Ethiopia later walked back its position, the damage was done. Trust between Addis Ababa and its southern neighbor deteriorated, and Ethiopia found itself increasingly isolated.
Inside Tigray, meanwhile, long-standing tensions are again on the rise. The regional leadership has demanded fuller implementation of post-war arrangements and greater autonomy, while federal forces maintain a heavy presence in key towns. The fragile peace is threatened by slow reconstruction, political fragmentation, and growing discontent among a population that has yet to see the dividends of peace.
The Horn of Africa has become a theater of realignment. Sudan, reeling from civil war, is largely absent from regional diplomacy. Somalia, under pressure from both internal insurgency and foreign maneuvering, is navigating a delicate balancing act. Djibouti, host to multiple foreign military bases, remains cautious but wary of any major shifts in the balance of power.
Ethiopia’s internal calculations remain unclear. On one hand, economic pressures and internal unrest argue for restraint. On the other, a deeply nationalistic narrative continues to take hold in some circles, framing port access as a historic right. The risk is that this sentiment could be weaponized in the lead-up to future elections or used as a distraction from internal failures.
For Eritrea, a return to war would be costly, but Asmara has proven it is willing to act decisively when it perceives existential threats. Its long-standing suspicion of Ethiopian intentions is unlikely to dissipate without clear guarantees. The Eritrean government remains one of the most secretive in the world, and its military remains on high alert.
Regional and international actors have begun to take notice. The African Union has offered quiet mediation, though its effectiveness remains in doubt. Western powers, preoccupied with other global crises, have yet to exert meaningful diplomatic pressure. The Gulf states, with increasing investments in the Red Sea corridor, may eventually play a more active role, but so far have maintained a cautious distance.
With old rivalries resurfacing and new alliances taking shape, the Horn of Africa is once again at a crossroads. Whether this moment leads to renewed confrontation or a reimagining of cooperation will depend on the wisdom of its leaders and the resolve of its people. What is certain is that the region can ill afford another war.
