With delays in activating a new UN-AU cost-sharing mechanism, both organisations must now redouble their efforts to secure funds.
A new African Union (AU) peace support mission in Somalia started work on 1 January. This is the third consecutive mission in the country, and like its predecessors, funding for its operations remains uncertain.
The new AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) replaced the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Its mandate is to support the country in state building and degrade al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups.
Perennial funding challenges were intended to be addressed by drawing on a new mechanism that allows United Nations (UN)-assessed contributions from member states to cover 75% of the annual mission cost, with the AU making up the remaining 25%. This approach was agreed under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719.
The UNSC’s December 2024 decision that set up AUSSOM (Resolution 2767) indicated the possibility of using this hybrid cost-sharing mechanism to fund the mission. But it set a six-month gap between the mission’s start and the application of the mechanism. The United States (US) had argued that, ‘the conditions have not been met for an immediate transition to the application of 2719 in Somalia.’
Hopefully, a UNSC meeting in May will resolve the issue by approving the new financial mechanism for AUSSOM.
Although funding is the mission’s biggest hurdle, it must also contend with political, operational and coordination challenges.
Division within the UNSC regarding implementing Resolution 2719 is a major concern
AUSSOM has been in the eye of a regional geopolitical storm. It was the subject of tension between Ethiopia – a major troop-contributing country for ATMIS – and Somalia over the memorandum of understanding signed between Addis Ababa and Somaliland, a self-declared independent state. Turkish mediation calmed the tension, creating conditions for Ethiopia’s possible participation in AUSSOM.
The mission started with all ATMIS’ troop- and-police contributing countries, except Burundi, which cited a discrepancy in troop allocation. Egypt may join as a new contributor, but a final agreement has yet to be reached on the mission’s composition.
Beyond these challenges, funding remains the most critical issue. During his 15 February AU summit address, UN Secretary-General António Guterres alluded to the uncertainty surrounding AUSSOM’s funding, stating, ‘We are urging for predictable funding for AUSSOM. I hope our voices will be heard by the Security Council.’
Past missions – the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and ATMIS – depended heavily on donor funding. The EU paid for troops’ stipends, while the UN provided logistical support packages to the missions and Somalia Security Forces through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).
However, these funding channels were inadequate, unpredictable and unsustainable. Somalia struggled to make sufficient progress in state building, including adopting a new constitution and building viable security institutions. This, together with the funding uncertainty, contributed to both peace missions’ operational ineffectiveness, delays in troop stipends, and difficulties in maintaining control of areas liberated from al-Shabaab.
Similar concerns now confront AUSSOM. Despite the hard-won success of getting Resolution 2719 passed in December 2023, several hurdles prevent cash from flowing to AUSSOM. Access to the UN-assessed contributions depends on meeting certain milestones in the UN-AU Roadmap for operationalising Resolution 2719.
To resolve this, the UNSC is expected to vote on the final approval of the hybrid funding mechanism in May, following its review of two major UN Secretary-General reports.
The most ominous challenge stems from shifting US policy priorities under Donald Trump
The first assesses progress in aligning AU and UN financial regulations and the AU’s ability to protect civilians, promote gender-responsive approaches, uphold human rights and contribute its 25% share of AUSSOM’s budget. The second reviews the possibility of using resources made available by UNSOS’ rightsizing to finance AUSSOM through Resolution 2719.
Since ATMIS ended its mandate on 31 December 2024, AUSSOM began operations last month without a clear funding plan for the mission’s first six months. Understandably, getting the new mission started was vital to prevent a security vacuum.
International Crisis Group Senior Analyst Omar S Mahmood says how the mission will be financed during this time remains unclear. In October 2024, the AU Peace and Security Council recommended using ‘part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment to substantially contribute to the financing of AUSSOM.’
The AU is applying the ATMIS arrangement to troop allowance payments until a UNSC decision on funding is reached, possibly from July 2025. However, the source of the funds to reimburse troop-contributing countries remains unclear. It’s also uncertain whether a contingency funding plan exists should the intended hybrid model not materialise after June.
Division within the UNSC regarding implementing Resolution 2719 is a major concern. The council’s decision to delay the resolution’s application until July 2025 reflected the intense debates that preceded AUSSOM’s endorsement.
Most UNSC members, including the Africa Group (A3), favoured the immediate application of Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM. But the US was reluctant and eventually abstained from Resolution 2767, which gave AUSSOM its mandate.
The US was also concerned about the lack of clarity on what part of the mission funding would be covered by Resolution 2719. It said the entire package, along with AUSSOM troop stipends and UNSOS should be financed through Resolution 2719, favouring a ‘one mission, one budget’ approach. Others on the council said 2719 funding is just for stipends, while UNSOS would remain under UN-assessed contributions.
The AU should develop a contingency plan should Resolution 2719’s application be delayed or suspended
The most ominous challenge stems from shifting US policy priorities under Donald Trump’s second administration. This has signalled the US’ broader retreat from multilateral commitments and reduced contributions to UN peacekeeping, such as the UN Haiti mission’s funding freeze.
This shift is already evident in a statement on 11 February from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, who said, ‘Resolution 2719 should not be used to fund AUSSOM as it would lock the U.S. into perpetual funding’ – noting the implications for the American taxpayer.
If the US extends this approach to broader peace operations, it will create a critical funding shortfall for AU- and UN-backed missions like AUSSOM, worsening existing financial constraints.
Nonetheless, the UN-AU Joint Task Team must expedite the process of completing the roadmap’s requirements to activate Resolution 2719. The AU Commission should outline its plan to provide 25% of the funds, which could entail convening a pledging conference.
The AU should also develop a contingency plan for financing AUSSOM should Resolution 2719’s application be delayed or suspended, including options for downsizing the mission. Consensus on the need for alternative funding for Somalia’s AU missions has existed for over a decade, but little progress has been made.
Gaining US support is key, considering that without AUSSOM, advances made against al-Shabaab in Somalia may be reversed. The AU – through the A3 – should engage with UNSC members, particularly the US, to avoid further funding delays. Somalia can use its UNSC membership, which started last month, to drive these efforts.
AUSSOM’s funding uncertainty highlights the broader challenge of financing Africa’s collective peace and security efforts. It is time for the continent to foster more African ownership while reducing overreliance on external sources.
